423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a well, or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 361 [656] In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few permanent houses but with new government land registration laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type, "homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even [657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone houses for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in location is involved.

342 The tent is called bait al-'Arab ("house of the Arabs"). There are two types: the bait al-saif ("summer house"), and the bait al-rabi'a ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of "gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is [286] [237] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford [435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the bait al-rabi'a costs to make or buy.

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan,Bedouin MT9
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sanctioned the direction of economic development from a pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production. Land reclamation and development projects administered by the cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops. In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy. Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a [181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends to be a "social equalizer."

But economic transformation as the intended goal of the Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and social relations take place. Because the cooperative society, as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle between the old and new.

The major problem encountered by the government officials in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
179 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
•[435] Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally been intended. The government could not really prosecute the guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program. Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
[673] Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[579] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system, which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Alabeidat tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 191 "unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[935] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
[661] who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

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[747] crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed and put into operation in al-Qasr.

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•435 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the government for the price of two piasters (about six cents). This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

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177 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the Russian tractors are the better.

407 241 654 [132] In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local government officials of the reclamation project requested an additional fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow 15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change, 731 233 [654] a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals, and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this. [166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley, or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica. Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the [432] [435] Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this, he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk reprisals.

177 657 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

177 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political
657 aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is
433 because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy
434 are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for
• [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha which it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
•435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

423 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership
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Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage groups, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

•[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another 583 554 556 435 "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 50 to 60 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

#613 682 #435 436 198 [591] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [231] [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

#613 682 554 591 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the 'aqila must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each 'aqila of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The 'aqila must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the 'aqila "should be rich." Though the 'aqaqil of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the 'aqila of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an 'aqila: "The 'aqila is responsible for his bait.

Part 2: Bodily Injuries

683 Awlad Ali recognize compensation for all sorts of bodily injuries sustained intentionally or accidentally. An elaborate scale of compensations is set as a basis for compromise. The basic principle involved is that an injury should be met by compensation in direct ratio to the severity, and the severity is assessed by the extent of a man's disability. Disability, in turn, is measured by the extent to which a man is prevented from participating in the communal activities which enable him to defend and maintain himself and his family according to the customary standards they are used to. It is a collective, as well as an individual, concern. A head injury or an injury to the hand may amount to a very serious defect if the person is unable to cultivate the barley fields or move with the herds for grazing or holding a gun to defend the family and group against an intruder who intends to do him harm. Death is considered the maximum disability, as are other injuries that take the person totally out of the collective activities, as in the case of injury 683 resulting in paralysis or blindness. All other injuries are compensated 435 by a fraction of the bloodmoney for homicide or L.E. 400.

Scale of Compensation for Bodily Injuries

El damiah Sughra (a small wound which does not cut the skin)	L. 1
El damiah Kubrah (a small wound which cuts the skin)	L. 4
El fakhera (a wound which cuts the skin and reaches the flesh under it)	L. 12
El badi'a (a wound which cuts the flesh on both sides)	L. 20
El mutifah (severe cuts to the flesh)	L. 30

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MIT Libraries Dewey MIT Archive AR

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El malta (a wound which cuts the skin and flesh and reaches the fat next to the bone) L. [illegible]

El muvadiha (a wound which cuts the skin, the flesh and the fat next to the bone and leaves the latter exposed) L. [illegible]

El hashima (skull fracture) L. [illegible]

El munkala (a head injury in which a piece of skull is removed) L. [illegible]

El maimuma (a head wound that causes permanent brain damage) L. [illegible]

Damage to the head hair:
if permanently damaged L. [illegible]
if grew back without damage L. [illegible]
(The above rule applies to the hair of the beard, mustache and eyelashes.)

Fracture of the hand: for each finger L. [illegible]

Fracture of the arm: for each bone L. [illegible]

Fracture of the leg: for each bone L. [illegible]

Broken ribs (unspecified number) L. [illegible]

Fracture of the foot L. [illegible]

Paralysis or severance of the fingers:
each joint (except those of the thumb) L. [illegible]

Paralysis or severance of the thumb:
each joint L. [illegible]

Loss of two ears L. [illegible]

Loss of one ear L. [illegible]

If hearing is impared, the defect is measured in relationship to the total utility of the ears, and compensation is estimated accordingly.

Complete loss of the eyesight L. [illegible]

Partial loss: to be assessed in proportion of that loss to the total utility.

Nose: if totally cut off L. [illegible]

Piercing the nostrils L. [illegible]

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If the two lips are cut off:	L. [illegible]
just the lower lip	L. [illegible]
just the upper lip	L. [illegible]
Visible piercing of the lips	L. 30
The tongue: if results in total loss of speech	L. [illegible]
Partial loss of speech is measured in proportion to that total loss.	
All the teeth	L. [illegible]
Each tooth	L. 30
Testicles: if cut off	L. [illegible]
The entire genitals	L. [illegible]
The breasts:	
of a nubile woman	L. [illegible]
of an old woman	L. [illegible]

683 As in the case of homicide, the above scale of compensation works only as a basis for compromise rather than as a definite or exact fixed

683 To assess the amount of injury and therefore the category of compensation,
689 the victim and his group, as well as a representative of the offender,
463 have to take the injured person to the "nazzar" who examines him and defines the kind of injury sustained. The nazzar is usually a member of

[619] one of the Murabiteen tribes who is known to possess a number of short books specifying the injuries and the amount of compensation required in each case. Before he assesses the wounds, both parties have to swear that

[465] they will accept his judgment, and they pay him a token fee that varies according to the ability to pay and the position of the parties involved.

683 The amount of money estimated by the nazzar is not necessarily the final amount of money paid. For, as in the case of homicide, it is subject to deductions in honor of various members who attend the meeting in which

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

CHAPTER VII

BLOODMONEY—WESTERN DESERT

000 Payment in Cash—Agreements to pay—Reprisals discouraged—Patricide—Detective Work—Death from Fright—Public Aversion—The twelve-year-old Bill—Informers—Ali Abu Bakr's Cistern—The Broken Rope—Found Drowned—Three Months' Hard Labour—Whose Rope?—Payment—The Old Man who fell off the Wall—The Clutches of the Police—A Well-conceived Lie—Ibrahim's Broken Leg—Ali's Cunning—The Fiasco at the Tomb—Reductions in Payment—The Dead Baby—Amateur Lawyers—The Two Shepherds and the Trespasser—Stick or Stone?—Legal Arguments—Travelling Allowance—Misappropriation—Chaos—Mirtah buys Sheep, while the Sayed buy Dates—The Clash—£300—Abdel Kerim and his Cousin—The Boys Fight—Result of pointing a Gun—Dirty Fingers—Serve him Right—The Two Married Sisters—A Gun Accident—Poor Towida—Successful Bluffing.

682 [171] [435] [562] In the Western Desert the laws of bloodmoney differ considerably from those of Sinai, the former being of African origin and the latter of Arabian. The Western Bedouin regard the price of a man as £300, irrespective of the market price of a camel; and the value of a woman's life as normally £150, or half that of a man.

682 695 562 In the absence of satisfactory evidence in a case of murder, if the oath be employed to decide the issue, fifty men will swear for a man's life, and twenty-five in a case involving the life of a woman. (NOTE. In some tribes these numbers are increased to fifty-five and twenty-seven respectively.)

682 621 As regards the payment and acceptance of bloodmoney, this is almost invariably by agreement between the families, and it is often difficult for an outsider to see any rhyme or

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

the different families. A year later the Gottaan brought up the case again, acknowledging the receipt of £50 from the Magai, but protesting that they had still not received anything from the Nefoofa. On an enquiry being held, a representative collection of infuriated members of the Nefoofa family came to court, protesting that Abd el Gelil had already collected their payments, and that if he had not handed over the money, their responsibility at any rate had ended for the moment. 682 672 693 695

It subsequently transpired, when Abd el Gelil was with difficulty got hold of and brought to court, that he had collected about £50, but claimed this sum as his own personal travelling expenses for collection. Then followed another lawsuit, in which the Nefoofa family sued their self-appointed lawyer for mis-appropriation of tribal funds. The details of this new case, and those of the original suit, were then re-capitulated and muddled up together, to the complete bewilderment of the writer and the entire satisfaction of the Bedouin assessors. [685]

Mention has been made of the extra £100 (£400 instead of £300) usually paid among the Gawabees tribe as the price of a life. It seems, however, as though there are exceptions to this rule; and the following case seems to shew that the payment of "Sanaa" depends on a variety of circumstances. 682 672 [435]

A family called Sirdani had had a bloodfeud with another family of the Gawabees called Sayed, one of the former having killed one of the latter some fifty years ago. The two families had been living in totally different districts, and for years had not come into contact with each other, and so the feud had been allowed to continue. 682 628 672

In the spring of 1921 a man of the first family, about forty-five years old, called Mirtah el Sirdani, left the Wadi Natrun for the Nile Valley to buy some sheep from the Fellaheen, taking with him his old mother and a small boy, to help him bring them back across the desert to the luscious grazing in the wadi swamps. He arrived at the

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

should have called a meeting with Abd el Salam, discussed the position sensibly with him, and then the two of them should have beaten all the boys soundly. Secondly, he ought never to have taken his gun with him, which was as stupid as it was dangerous. The fact that Abd el Kerim himself knew that it was not loaded made not the slightest difference to the case, as the boys did not, and could not, know whether it was loaded or not. As one of the sheikhs expressed it, "If you point a gun at me, loaded or unloaded, I'm not going to risk it. So if I retaliate by braining you, then that's your fault—not mine!"

As compared with some of the customs obtaining among the Sinai Arabs, the following case among the Aulad Ali in the Western Desert is illuminating, and will be quoted in full. The question of who is "chief mourner" of the deceased, and who draws the largest share in a bloodmoney case varies considerably between the tribes of Arab and Berber origin. Among the Aulad Ali a woman killed is automatically half the value of a man, whereas among the Arabs the value of a woman depends on a variety of conditions.

A man called Idris had two daughters, Towida and Beida. Beida married a man called Korayem Shushan of the Gereidat tribe, and Towida married Farag Gueida of the Mowalik tribe. A son had been born to Towida and Farag called Lataif Farag; and when Lataif was about four years old, his parents quarrelled about some trifling matter, and Farag divorced Towida. Two months after this, Towida went to spend a day or two with her sister Beida and Korayem, and it was while sitting alone in their tent that the accident happened which was the cause of this lawsuit. It seems that Korayem had left a loaded gun tied up with cord to the roof of the tent, suspended from the poles. While Towida was sitting there, a sudden gust of wind got up, and shook the tent violently. As the tent rocked in the wind, the gun came tumbling down on to a wooden chest between the poles; the impact fired the